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The modern era of allogenic organ transplantation began in the mid 
1960s. Then, improvement in surgical techniques, understanding of 
immunologic tolerance, and the development of drugs to control 
rejection expanded the technical feasibility of transplantation procedures. 
To some this represented a "crisis of success" as there was a resultant 
increase in demand for organs without a parallel increase in supply. 
According to the United Network for Organ Sharing' database there are 
now 75,000 patients waiting for an organ. Among those waiting for a 
heart or liver transplant approximately 113 will die before an organ 
becomes available.2 The primary source of donor organs will be those 
who have had an irreversible cessation of total brain function and who 
are being maintained on ventilators in intensive care units. These are 
commonly called Heart Beating Cadaver Donors and will constitute a 
pool of 10,000-12,000 potential donors per year. Despite extensive public 
awareness campaigns, the ratio of actual to potential donors has not 
increased sufficiently. One response has been to attempt a greater 
reliance on living donors (kidneys) partial transplants (liver and lungs) 
and sources of dubious ethical propriety such as anencephalic infants3 
and animals.4 
Another potential source of transplantable organs is patients who 
have been declared dead by traditional cardiopulmonary, rather than 
brain-based criteria. These are referred to as Non-Heart Beating Cadaver 
Donors. The success of transplants using organs from these sources has 
been limited by problems with warm ischemia. Two recent strategies to 
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circumvent the problem of warm ischemia l are in situ preservation 
following uncontrolled pulmonary arrest and2 procurement from patients 
who have died after choosing to forego life-support treatment. Both of 
these methods of procuring organs from Non-Heart Beating Cadaver 
Donors (NHBCD) have posed a new array of ethical problems related to l 
ethical issues related to the definition of death2 potential conflicts of 
interest and3 acceptable behavior in controlling the dying process4 the 
consent process for procurement.5 
The major problem with organs taken from NHBCD is the 
deterioration of organs from warm ischemia. This is resultant from the 
prolonged period between the declaration of death following aseptole and 
the process of removing organs. Two approaches have been suggested: 
1. Uncontrolled Cardiopulmonary Death 
These are usually patients who are brought to an emergency room 
and die as a result of myocardial infarction or mUltiple traumas. To avoid 
warm ischemia a balloon catheter is inserted and inflated above and 
below the renal arteries and the kidneys are cooled by an infusion of cold 
preservative solution through this catheter and cannulas inserted through 
the abdominal wall. 
Because of difficulty in obtaining consent from families 
overwhelmed by the circumstances of a sudden unanticipated demise, the 
Organ Bank of Illinois has proposed that the insertion of cannulas for 
installation of preservative solutions be carried out prior to asking for 
family consent. This is based on an experience of greater likelihood of 
getting consent if catheters are already in place and approaches to 
families are therefore less urgent. 
Despite disclaimers that inserting catheters are non-deforming or 
non-mutilating,6 there is a great deal of concern about proceeding 
without family consent. There is little consensus about the morality of 
performing invasive procedures on dead patients to benefit others. At a 
minimum they are disrespectful of the dead, disregard family input and 
foster unwanted attitudes in medical staff. 7 
2. Controlled Timing and Place of Death 
This method is what has become commonly known as the 
Pittsburgh Protocol. Under this protocol families who have decided to 
forego life support may be approached to donate organs. The decision to 
stop life support should in all instances precede the decision to donate. 
This allows time for discussion before any invasive procedure and the 
time and location of death are controlled. Warm ischemia time is 
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minimized by taking the patient to the operating room before organs are 
removed immediately after pronouncement of death. 
For purposes of discussion, it will be assumed that the decision to 
stop the ventilator is appropriate given the circumstances of patient's 
terminal condition. The family must give fully informed consent to 1) 
placement of a femoral artery catheter to measure pulse pressure, 2) 
declaration of death following absence of pulse pressure when the 
ventilator is removed, 3) removal of organs after death is declared 4) If 
removal of life support does not result in death of the patient "in a very 
short time", the procedure will be cancelled and the patient returned to 
intensive care. 
Death is declared after 1) two minutes of ventricular fibrillation 2) two 
minutes of asystole or 3) two minutes of electromechanical dissociation. 
Ethical Issues 
A fundamental question is whether increasing the number of 
transplants deserves to be a priority in a time of scarce resources.9 To 
what extent is the attempt to increase the number of donor organs 
influenced by the increase in the number of surgeons and institutions 
performing transplantation and the need to increase the funding of 
centers whose prestige, opportunities for training and funding for 
research depend on increasing the number of operations done? Public 
perception of motives other than saving lives might undermine the 
acceptance of dramatic programs to increase NHBCD. 
Issues Regarding Defining and/or Hastening Death 
Criteria for death using brain-based standards have constantly and 
incontrovertibly focused on irreversibility both in statutory and clinical 
definitions. Irreversibility confirms death to reinforce certainly that death 
is final with no hope of recovery. The Uniform Determination of Death 
Act states "An individual who has sustained either 1) irreversible cessation 
of respiratory and circulatory functions or 2) irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain including the brain stem is dead. A 
determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical 
standards." This standard has been enacted into statutes in most states . 
The concept of irreversibility has been defined as "a lost function 
cannot be restored by anyone, under any circumstances at any time now 
or in the future." A less categorical definition states "the loss of function 
cannot be reversed by those present at this time." 'o 
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Under the Pittsburgh Protocol, death is declared after two minutes 
when the failure to restore cardiac function will result not from a lack of 
present means, but from a decision not to use them. The patient who has 
qualified as NHBCD may be in a state when organs are removed where it 
might be possible to restore function, but a decision has been made not to 
attempt to do so. This raises questions as to whether the Pittsburgh 
protocol fulfills the criterion of irreversibility. Defenders of the protocol 
argue that irreversibility should be determined by an inability to 
autoresuscitate. It is customary to declare those patients dead who have 
Do Not Resuscitate Orders and who arrest when we have no plans to 
resuscitate them. There are no data to confirm that autoresuscitate is 
impossible after the two minutes allowed in the Pittsburgh Protocol. 
Shewmon II has suggested a longer period of 20 minutes but he also lacks 
data to confirm a more prolonged period of observation precluding 
autoresuscitation. 
How does adding the goal of procuring organs affect the morality 
of the situation? Is it possible to be confident that the goal of acquiring 
viable organs does not affect decisions made in the best interest of the 
dying patient? 
Will the use of narcotics to control pain be altered when organ 
harvesting is anticipated? Will the decision to discontinue life support be 
derivative of the anticipated organ donation despite scrupulous attempts 
to separate the decision to stop the respirator from the decision to donate 
organs? Is it possible, in other words, to be sure that the decision to 
shorten life will not be influenced by the reality that death is to occur in a 
fashion that produces viable organs? 
It will be difficult for families and health care personnel to avoid 
the impression that the death is staged or even ceremonial. There will be 
emotional consequences for those who must say their farewells to a 
conscious or unconscious patient who is then wheeled to the operating 
room to die among strangers who have heretofore not participated in his 
care. It would be possible to insert femoral catheters in the intensive care 
unit and then remove life support prior to taking the patient to the 
operating room. It is questionable whether this would ameliorate 
emotional reactions or actually aggravate them by mixing patient care 
and transplant procedures inseparably. 
The Consent Process 
When the strategy of the health care team is directed toward 
increasing the number of transplantable organs, the consent process may 
be altered. It is usually assumed that both the donor and the next of kin 
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would agree to the donation. In practice, different organ procurement 
organizations proceed differentlyY 19% follow the deceased's wishes, 
19% follow the next of kin's wishes, 10% proceed if neither party objects 
and 8% proceed if either party consents or neither objects. The 
availability of a Durable Power of Attorney or a Living Will could 
strongly affect the decision. There is seemingly no national consensus as 
to what constitutes valid consent. Clear direction from an advanced 
directive or a unanimous agreement between patient and family would 
seem to constitute a minimum requirement for most hospital settings in 
contrast with Organ Procurement Organizations' policies. 
Public Policy Considerations 
While a heroic attempt has been made in the Pittsburgh Protocol to 
protect the best interests of donors and to separate caregivers and 
transplant teams rigorously, the pervasive atmosphere, rightly or 
wrongly, is to guarantee an increase in available donor organs. In an 
institution that identifies itself as a "transplantation center" and in which 
the salutary goal of saving lives of critically ill patients pervades the 
environment, strict standards will be vulnerable to "end justifies the 
means" rationales. Although under the common law, no one has a 
property interest in a dead body 13, a limited interest in a corpse resides 
with the next of kin who are expected to arrange for the disposition of the 
remains. A pre-mortem decision to donate one's organs is not binding on 
next of kin. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act adopted in all states, made 
it possible for an individual to make an anatomic gift, which would take 
effect upon death. This was followed by the Uniform Determination of 
Death Act to clarify the dead donor rule, now operative in 47 states. The 
National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 established a mechanism for 
finding donors and prioritizing recipients. This system, not surprisingly, 
has not achieved the goal of matching organ supply with demand. The 
shortfall using brain-based criteria to qualify heart beating cadaver 
donors (HBCD) has further encouraged the development of protocols for 
non-heart beating cadaver donors (NHBCD). 
The very sensitive background to these strategies is the public's 
confidence in the process. If the public perceives that the motivation is 
self-interest rather than life saving, the end result might be a decrease 
rather than an increase in the availability of transplantable organs. 
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Summary 
Programs for the use of Non Heart Beating Cadaver Donors are 
subject to a variety of ethical concerns: 14 
1) Are these programs using new and invalidated criteria for determining 
death? 
2) Is the dying process being engineered to accommodate the need for 
more usable organs? 
3) Are rules for consent being manipulated to accomplish this same end? 
4) Are invasive procedures being carried out on recently dead patients 
without consent of near relatives and what are the ethical and possible 
legal consequences? 
5) Are there alterations which are possibly harmful in the case of the 
terminally ill patient? 
6) Will the mourning process be affected in perhaps a long-term adverse 
way, by the contrived removal of the patient to the operating room prior 
to discontinuing life support? 
7) Will the decision tu discontinue life support be affected? 
Until NHBCD programs can be evaluated for impact on concepts 
of Life vs . death, active vs. passive hastening of death and interests of 
dying patients vs. interests of organ recipients, the medical professions 
must proceed with extreme caution. Much of what is proposed is 
counterintentive and public backlashes a definite risk. In the meanwhile, 
much of the ambivalence about the propriety of the use of brain-based 
criteria has been clarified if not settled by Pope John Paul II on August 
29, 2000, in his address to the International Congress on Transplants. A 
portion of the text of his address is appended to this document. In this 
highly significant statement Pope John Paul II said that the use of brain-
based criteria for "ascertaining the fact of death" does not conflict with 
"the essential elements of a sound anthropology." He also said that 
"health workers responsible for ascertaining death can use these criterion 
in individual cases with that degree of assurance in ethical judgment 
which moral teaching describes as 'moral certainty'." 
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With this kind of endorsement of brain-based criteria for 
determining death, it is difficult to justify entering into the murky waters 
of using asystolic donors. 
Appendix - John Paul II on Neurologic Criteria 
The following is a portion of Pope John Paul II 's "Address to the 
International Congress on Transplants" , August 29, 2000. 
When Does Death Occur? 
Acknowledgment of the unique dignity of the human person has a 
further underlying consequence: vital organs which occur singly in the 
body can be removed only after death, that is from the body of someone 
who is certainly dead. This requirement is self-evident, since to act 
otherwise would mean intentionally to cause the death of the donor in 
disposing of his organs. This gives rise to one of the most debated issues 
in contemporary bioethics, as well as to serious concerns in the minds of 
ordinary people. I refer to the problem of ascertaining the fact of death. 
When can a person be considered dead with complete certainty? 
In this regard it is helpful to recall that the death of the person is a 
single event, consisting in the total disintegration of that unitary and 
integrated whole that is the personal self. It results from the separation of 
the life principle (or soul) from the corporal reality of the person. The 
death of the person, understood in this primary sense, is an event which 
no scientific technique or empirical method can identify directly. 
Yet human experience shows that once death occurs certain 
biological signs inevitably follow, which medicine has learnt to 
recognize with increasing precision. In this sense, the "criteria" for 
ascertaining death used by medicine today should not be understood as 
the technical scientific determination of the exact moment of a person 's 
death, but as a scientifically secure means of identifying the biological 
signs that a person has indeed died. 
Neurological Criteria Accepted 
It is a well-known fact that for some time certain scientific approaches 
to ascertaining death have shifted the emphasis from the traditional cardio-
respiratory signs to the so called "neurological" criterion. Specifically, 
this consists in establishing, according to clearly determined parameters 
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commonly held by the international scientific community, the complete 
and irreversible cessation of all brain activity (in the cerebrum, 
cerebellum and brain stem). This is then considered the sign that the 
individual organism has lost its integrative capacity. 
With regard to the parameters used today for ascertaining death -
whether the "encephalic" signs or the more traditional cardio-respiratory 
signs - the Church does not make technical decisions. She limits herself 
to the Gospel duty of comparing the data offered by medical science with 
the Christian understanding of the unity of the person, bringing out the 
similarities and the possible conflicts capable of endangering respect for 
human dignity. 
Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times 
for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the complete and irreversible 
cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied, does not seem to 
conflict with the essential elements of a sound anthropology. Therefore a 
health worker professionally responsible for ascertaining death can use 
these criteria in each individual case as the basis for arriving at that 
degree of assurance in ethical judgment which moral teaching describes 
as "moral certainty." This moral certainty is considered the necessary and 
sufficient basis for an ethically correct course of action. Only where such 
certainty exists, and where informed consent has already been given by 
the donor or the donor's legitimate representatives, is it morally right to 
initiate the technical procedures required for the removal of organs for 
transplant. 
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